EA - Some core assumptions of effective altruism, according to me by peterhartree
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Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Some core assumptions of effective altruism, according to me, published by peterhartree on July 29, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Zvi recently posted a (critical) list of core assumptions of effective altruism. The list is interesting, but I think much of it is somewhere between “a bit off” and “clearly inaccurate”. In this post I redraft the list, applying a round of suggested edits. Compared to Zvi's list, mine is somewhat aspirational, but I also think it's a more accurate description of the current reality of effective altruism (as body of ideas, and as community). Important: these are just my takes! I'm not speaking on behalf of current or past employers, key figures in the movement, or anything like that. This list is not intended to be comprehensive. I'd love to read your thoughts—including your own suggested edits and additions—in the comments. If you like, make a copy of my Google Doc! Some core assumptions of effective altruism, according to me Two-thirds utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is a useful and underrated way to think about what matters in some circumstances. Other theories of value and normative frameworks should be given serious consideration and weight, partly due to moral uncertainty. Taking utilitarianism seriously does not imply that people should go around thinking in utilitarian terms most of the time. The mindsets suggested by moral perfectionism, deontology, virtue ethics and common-sense ethics are often more helpful in daily life. [1] Importance of suffering. All else equal, suffering is bad, and happiness/pleasure is good. Morally, it may be more important to reduce suffering than to increase happiness. Empirically, it may be easier to reduce suffering than to increase happiness (though this is not obvious). This assumption does not oblige us to only care about pleasure and suffering, and certainly not to “focus on the floor of the human condition, rather than the ceiling”. [2] Model-based interventions. Making explicit models, as opposed to compelling stories, is important. In some areas (e.g. global health), we can learn a lot by investing in careful empirical measurement and testing. In others (e.g. anthropogenic existential risk) we are obliged to rely on speculative (but still useful) models, often informed by the projection of historical trends, evolutionary theory, and/or first principles thinking. We should not be afraid to bet heavily on these models.[3] Diverse funding models. If you want >$1m funding, you probably need to apply to one of a few large funders. But if you want small project or seed funding, there are many funding sources available to you, including >50 individuals who can say “yes” with very little constraint from other parties.[4] Scope sensitivity. Preventing 100 people going blind is 100x better than preventing one person going blind. We should have run COVID vaccine challenge trials in January 2020. Shut up and multiply. Duty of privilege. If you are fortunate to have freedom, security, good health, and so on, you should dedicate some part of your resources (e.g. time and money) to trying to help others as much as possible. You should decide how much, but we encourage at least 10%.[5] Effectiveness. Do what works. Seek feedback. Keep learning. Cultivate intellectual virtues, such as quickly updating when you’re wrong, threading the needle between overconfidence and underconfidence, etc etc etc etc. Impartial altruism. One of the best ways to do good yourself is to take up an impartial perspective when you're thinking about how to spend your altruistic resources. This yields surprisingly large opportunities at the moment, because relatively few people do this. This may be especially true if you endorse a zero-discount rate for welfare, which probably implies that the interests of far-future generations...
